Euthanasia Reconsidered-The Choice of Death as an Aspect of the Right of Privacy Symposium: Law and the Aged by Delgado, Richard
Alabama Law Scholarly Commons 
Articles Faculty Scholarship 
1975 
Euthanasia Reconsidered-The Choice of Death as an Aspect of 
the Right of Privacy Symposium: Law and the Aged 
Richard Delgado 
University of Alabama - School of Law, rdelgado@law.ua.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ua.edu/fac_articles 
Recommended Citation 
Richard Delgado, Euthanasia Reconsidered-The Choice of Death as an Aspect of the Right of Privacy 
Symposium: Law and the Aged, 17 Ariz. L. Rev. 474 (1975). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ua.edu/fac_articles/455 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Alabama Law Scholarly 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Alabama Law Scholarly 
Commons. 
EUTHANASIA RECONSIDERED - THE CHOICE OF
DEATH AS AN ASPECT OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Richard Delgado*
In recent years, successive holdings by the Supreme Court of the
United States have drawn a protective mantle of privacy about certain
decisions that fundamentally affect the human life cycle.' This cycle
may be viewed as a kind of trajectory, whose peak between birth and
death represents the capacity for productivity and independent action.
The Court has included many of the choices that determine the shape of
that trajectory within the right of privacy. Thus, it has been held that
23decisions regarding marriage, contraception,3 procreation, 4 and the
raising and educating of children 5 are protected. One critical choice that
has, so far, escaped inclusion in the list of protected decisions is the
choice of the terminus of that trajectory-the moment and manner of
one's death.6 Today, suicide is treated as a crime in only a small
minority of American jurisdictions.7 Still, aiding and abetting suicide is
* Faculty Fellow, Program in Law, Science, and Medicine, Yale Law School;
Assistant Professor of Law (designate), University of Washington School of Law. B.A.
1960, University of Washington; J.D. 1974, University of California, Berkeley.
1. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 211-13 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring);
Wheeler & Kovar, Roe v. Wade: The Right of Privacy Revisited, 21 KAN. L. REv. 527,
545 (1973); Note, Roe and Paris: Does Privacy Have a Principle? 26 STAN. L. REV.
1161, 1174 (1974); cf. Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Foreword: Toward a
Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1, 32-43 (1973).
2. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
3. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
4. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942).
5. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
6. Commonwealth v. Noxon, 319 Mass. 495, 66 N.E.2d 814 (1946); State v.
Zygmaniak, No. 1197-72 (Super. Ct., Monmouth County, N.J., Oct. 15, 1973), noted in
Comment, The Right to Die, 10 CALI. WEST. L. REv. 613 (1974); Sanders, Euthanasia:
None Dare Call It Murder, 60 J. ClMM. L.C. & P.S. 351, 351-55 (1969); Silving,
Euthanasia: A Study in Comparative Criminal Law, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 350 (1950).
7. P- PERKINs, CRimmAL LAw 82-85 (2d ed. 1969); see Commonwealth v. Mink,
123 Mass. 422, 429 (1877); State v. Carney, 69 N.J.L. 478, 480, 55 A. 44, 45 (1903).
EUTHANASIA
often punished as a felony,8 and affirmative acts, even the acts of a
physician in response to the requests of a competent, terminally ill
patient, designed to hasten the arrival of death, constitute the crime of
first-degree murder.9 The Supreme Court has yet to review a case
involving euthanasia or mercy killing.
Observers have attributed this judicial and legislative neglect of
euthanasia, at least in part, to the manner in which thoughts of death
raise deeply internalized psychological resistances. Unlike marriage, sex,
and childbirth, death is an intensely anxiety-producing subject.10 Its
contemplation would be easier if there were more opportunities in our
society to observe death. We would then appreciate, in more than a
merely abstract way, that those who want to die often want to do so with
a fervor approaching desperation," may have every reason for wanting
to do so, 2 yet may lack the means to accomplish their purpose un-
aided.' 3 The pain of the terminal patient, like the plight of the would-be
suicide whose life has become an intolerable burden, is foreign to the
8. R. PER n S, supra note 7, at 84-85; see Burnett v. People, 204 Ill. 208, 68 N.E.
505 (1903); Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146, 163 (1872); Aven v. State, 102 Tex.
Crim. 478, 277 S.W. 1080 (1925).
9. W. CtnuN & E. SHAPimo, LAw, MEDICInE, AND FOREN Sc SCIENCE 130 (1970).
It has been suggested that informal devices, such as "jury nullification" and a conspiracy
of silence within the medical profession, operate to protect the patient and physician who
decide to resort to euthanasia. Kutner, Due Process of Euthanasia: The Living Will, A
Proposal, 44 IND. LJ. 539, 541 (1968). Still, there have been numerous prosecutions and
some convictions, of physicians and others responsible for mercy killings. See cases
collected in Comment, supra note 6, at 614-16. There seem to have been somewhat
more prosecutions and convictions in England than the United States, Parry-Jones,
Criminal Law and Complicity in Suicide and Attempted Suicide, 13 MFD. Scr. & L. 110
(1973), possibly as a result of the intense publicity engendered by the very active
English Euthanasia Society.
Although empirical data is lacking, it seems likely that the threat of penal and
professional sanctions operates as a deterrent to the physician, particularly in cases
where the family and the physician have not developed a long term relationship of trust
and respect. See Comment, supra note 6, at 615-16.
If a constitutionally-based right to die is recognized, that right would immunize a
physician who, acting at the direction of an individual entitled to exercise the right,
administered death-dealing drugs. Williams v. Preiser, 479 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1974);
Vuitch v. Hardy, 473 F.2d 1370 (4th Cir. 1973).
10. See, e.g., D. MAGUmE, DEATH By CHroicE 1-2 (1974); Morris, Voluntary
Euthanasia, 45 WAsH. L. REv. 239, 239-40 (1970); Williams, Euthanasia and Abortion,
38 U. CoLo. L. REv. 178 (1966). Maguire, supra, suggests that traditional attitudes
about death as a fearsome subject, to be avoided in polite discourse, may be changing.
Sanders' discussion, supra note 6, like that of many other commentators on euthanasia, is
directed primarily to the case of the terminally ill patient. The scope of most commentar-
ies appears to be so limited because they are directed to legislatures as a policy matter.
Although this Article focuses on the aged and terminally ill, the constitutional principles
developed contemplate no such limitation, in principle, and should be equally applicable
to the healthy and the ill.
11. D. MAGUEI, supra note 10, at 43, observes that the elderly often fear the
prolongation of dying more than they fear death itself.
12. For a description of the despair and hopelessness experienced by terminally ill
patients denied humane assistance in hastening the arrival of death, see id. at 7-48.
13. Morris, supra note 10, at 244. Healthy persons can, of course, commit suicide by
ingesting an overdose of drugs or leaping off a bridge. For the seriously incapacitated,
however, this escape may be physically impossible. See cases cited in D. MAGtJrmE, supra
note 10, at 13-14, 23-24.
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experience of most persons, however.14  While most legislators and
judges have experienced marriage, the birth of children, and the rais-
ing of offspring, few have personally witnessed the despair and helpless-
ness of an aged, sick loved one whose greatest desire is to end his
misery.15 This may explain, but cannot justify, the lack of attention
devoted to the civil liberties of persons who wish to die. Logical consist-
ency, not to mention simple compassion, demand that this oversight be
reconsidered.
This Article begins with an evaluation of the thesis that decisions
relating to death, like those relating to birth, sex, and marriage, are
deserving of constitutional protection by virtue of the right of privacy.",
Concluding that they are, the Article ventures an analysis of the parame-
ters of such a right. Since privacy, like other individual rights protected
by the Constitution, is a limited rather than an absolute right, and is
thus capable of being overridden by state interests, 1 a number of inter-
ests which have been asserted against a right to die are evaluated. 18
Although it is concluded that many of these are insufficient to meet the
14. Moore, The Case of Voluntary Euthanasia, 42 U.M.K.C.L. REv. 327, 330
(1974). For a description of the manner in which advancing medical technology has
outstripped our ability to deal with death, see Stevens, Do Patients Have Rights in the
Timing of Their Own Deaths?, 8 NEW ENGLAND L. Re. 181, 181-82 (1974). Today, life
can be maintained almost indefinitely if the patient is willing to endure the discomfort
and expense of an existence dependent on mechanical devices.
15. See E. KuHnLnR-Ross, ON DEATH AND DYING 5-7 (1969); Moore, supra note 14,
at 330.
16. Although some commentators have hinted that the decision to die may be
protected by the right of privacy, Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving
Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life, 26 RUToEs L.
Rav. 228, 239-41 (1973); Comment, supra note 6, at 620-22, at this writing none have
offered a satisfactory analytical rationale for extending the right to euthanasia nor
suggested the logical contours of such a right.
There are numerous ways in which the question of voluntary euthanasia could arise
in court. It could be raised as a defense in a prosecution of a physician for the homicide
of his patient, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 120, 127 (1973), as a direct challenge to
the constitutionality of denying euthanasia in a declaratory judgment action brought by a
patient, see Roe v. Wade, supra at 120, in a wrongful death action by the survivors
against the physician, or even obliquely in a products liability action for wrongful death.
Cf. Zygmaniak v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 131 NJ. Super. 403, 408-11, 330 A.2d. 56,
59-61 (1974) (refusal to rule as a matter of law that requested shotgun killing of
severely injured motorcycle accident victim was so unforseeable as to relieve defendant
of liability). For a recent opinion that bases the right to refuse medical treatment, even
though the refusal is likely to result in death, on the right of privacy enunciated in Roe,
see In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619 (C.P. Northampton County, Pa. 1973).
17. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
18. A few recent commentaries have suggested that a purely utilitarian analysis of
the impacts or interests involved in technological or bio-ethical decisionmaking may
prove inadequate to take account of all relevant considerations. See Sagoff, On Preserv-
ing the Natural Environment, 84 YALE L.u. 205 (1974); Tribe, Technology Assessment
and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of Instrumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L.
REv. 617 (1972). A sequel to this Article, now in preparation, explores a number of
arguments, which could be raised in connection with euthanasia statutes, that are both
nonreligious and nonutilitarian. The present analysis confines itself to consideration of
those interests broadly categorized as utilitarian, which courts have traditionally consid-
ered to be implicated in due process or equal protection analysis. See Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 147-64 (1973); In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331
F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
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compelling interest standard applied in recent privacy decisions, others
appear more substantial. These latter interests may, in certain circum-
stances, circumscribe the interest of the person who elects death.
DYING AND PRIVACY: THE THRESHOLD ARGUMENT
In assessing the nature of the privacy interest underlying the choice
to die, the most illuminating judicial treatment of an analogous interest
is found in the abortion cases, Roe v. Wade 9 and Doe v. Bolton.20
Although these decisions dealt with the interest of a pregnant woman in
putting an end to the development of her fetus, rather than the interest
of an individual in ending his own life, the generality of the language
employed and the many parallels between the two situations suggest that
their rationale can be extended to the latter case as well.
Roe reaffirms privacy's protection of individual autonomy in inti-
mate and momentous matters.2 1 The Court prepared for its conclusion
that the "right of privacy. . . is broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy"2 2 by citing a series
of cases which found a constitutionally protected interest in decisions
relating to procreation, marriage, and family life.23 The emphasis in
these cases on the intimacy and importance of such matters24 suggests
that the right to privacy extends to other important and intimate matters.
Eisenstadt v. Baird,25 in particular, indicates that marriage, procreation,
and family life are merely illustrative of the constitutionally protected
zones of privacy. "If the right of privacy means anything," the Court
declared, "it is the right. . . to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.
' 26
The analysis used in Roe to show that a woman is so fundamentally
affected by the decision to terminate her pregnancy that the right of
privacy protects her autonomy in making that decision applies with
19. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
20. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
21. See Note, supra note 1, at 1166. In light of the justly criticized opacity of the
Court's reasoning in Roe, see Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe
v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973), the principles underlying the decision must be elic-
ited by eliminating the hypotheses which explain the earlier contraception cases but are
inconsistent with Roe. Performing this examination, one writer convincingly eliminates
all but the view that the right of privacy protects individual autonomy in important mat-
ters. See Note, supra note 1, at 1166.
22. 410 U.S. at 153.
23. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
24. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
25. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
26. Id. at 453 (emphasis added).
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equal force to the decision to die. Like the decision to abort, the decision
to obtain a merciful injection of lethal drugs is a highly personal
decision involving the individual and his physician. The significance,
in both cases, of the involvement of the physician is not the traditional
privacy of the doctor-patient relationship, for other professional relation-
ships are traditionally but not constitutionally private.28 Rather, it is the
physician's special competence to advise the patient of the state of his
closest physical, mental, and social associate 2P-his own body. Indeed,
the decision to die is even more intimate than the decision to abort since
no potentially independent entity is destroyed. 0
Moreover, as with abortion prior to Roe, the present prohibition of
euthanasia is in substantial part predicated upon judgments that are
explicitly recognized as private by the Constitution.3 The first amend-
ment commits religious choices to individual discretion, 2 yet the pro-
scription of euthanasia and abortion is based on ethical and religious
beliefs concerning the sanctity of life. 3 That the dispute over the
propriety of mercy killing is waged with reference to such doctrine is
further evidence of the intimacy of the choices involved. 4
The decision to terminate a pregnancy and the decision to termi-
nate one's own life share more than intimacy. The consequences which
make the abortion decision a crucial choice for the individual precisely
parallel those which make euthanasia momentous. Like the mother
compelled to bear an unwanted child, the individual forced to continue a
pain-racked existence suffers severe physical and psychological detri-
ments3" and faces the prospect of a "distressful life and future."30 Like
the mother forced to raise a child whose care she does not choose to
assume, the individual who is compelled to continue living may be
required to exhaust his personal fortune in an undertaking not of his
own choosing.3 7 Indeed, requiring a person to remain alive who finds
27. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973); In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. &
C.2d 619, 623 (C.P. Northampton County, Pa. 1973).
28. Cf. Note, supra note 14, at 1178-79.
29. "Intimate: ... 2: marked by a very close physical, mental, or social
association... ." WFasER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1184 (1963).
30. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
31. The close connection between first amendment guarantees and the right of
privacy is apparent from the prominence of that amendment in the privacy line of cases.
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564
(1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965).
32. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420 (1961).
33. See, e.g., Hassett, Freedom and Order Before God: A Catholic View, 31
N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 1170, 1184-88 (1956); Williams, supra note 10, at 180; Comment, Legal
Aspects of Euthanasia, 36 ALBANY L. REv. 674, 675 (1972).
34. See United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 78 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting in
part).
35. See text & notes 11-14 supra.
36. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
37. See generally Euthanasia Questions Stir New Debate, MEDIcAL WoRrD NEWS,
[Vol. 17
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life distasteful and a burden, even more than a prohibition of abortion,
subordinates that person's wishes to societal notions of life's purpose and
comes very close to offending the values sought to be protected by the
13th amendment.38
The intimacy and importance of the decision to select the timing of
one's death thus provide a doctrinal basis for concluding that the right of
privacy protects this decision.3 9 The parallel between abortion and
euthanasia, however, extends beyond constitutional doctrine to the social
ramifications of present mercy-killing law. Like the prohibition of abor-
tion, current law barring euthanasia subordinates tangible social needs
to the moral convictions of some. The overtones of "population growth,
pollution, [and] poverty" 40 which were present in the abortion contro-
versy have companions in the euthanasia issue. In light of the shortage
and attendant high cost of medical facilities, the use of these facilities to
compel the unwilling to live misallocates scarce resources. 41 Moreover,
the prohibition of mercy killing forces individuals to deplete personal
financial resources which they might reasonably prefer to distribute to
loved ones rather than to the medical profession.42 Like the abortion
and birth control cases, therefore, the question whether the right of
privacy confers a right to die implicates moral values given the force of
law at a high social cost.
Sept. 14, 1973, at 78 (suggesting the possibility that health care facilities may incur
liability for postponing death unreasonably by extensive, extraordinary measures, over
the objections of the patient and his family).
38. See Tribe, supra note 1, at 39-40; cf. Note, Asexual Reproduction and Genetic
Engineering: A Constitutional Assessment of the Technology of Cloning, 47 S. CAL. L.
REV. 476, 516-28 (1974). Support -for this argument may be found in the anti-slavery
clause of the 13th amendment. The argument is strengthened by reports that physicians
have succeeded in maintaining the body functions of individuals for up to 2 years,
even though the patients had sunk into an irreversible coma. Capron & Kass, A Statu-
tory Definition of the Standard for Determining Human Death: An Appraisal and a
Proposal, 121 U. PA. L. Rnv. 87,92 (1972).
39. Even apart from a showing of momentousness and intimacy, some courts have
founded a right to refuse life-preserving medical treatment, and thereby invite death, on a
broader principle-the right to do with one's body what one pleases. Schloendorff v.
Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914), overruled on other grounds,
Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656. 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957): see Natanson v.
Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, rehearing denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670
(1960). In his concurring opinion in Roe v. Wade, Justice Douglas urged that the right
of privacy involves a right to make basic life decisions and to care for one's own health
and person free from restraint, 410 U.S. at 211-14, but the majority was not ready to go
so far. Id. at 154. Commentators have urged that such a right would be consistent with
classic libertarian writing. Note, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient, 83 YALE L.T.
1632, 1643 (1974). See also Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 CoLum. L. REv. 1410
(1974).
40. Roe v. Wade, 410U.S. 113, 116 (1973).
41. See generally Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 275-76
(1974) (Douglas, J., separate opinion).
42. For a vivid example of heroic medical measures applied in a losing cause, see
Morris, supra note 10, at 248 n.23.
Apart from the interest in not depleting their estates in a losing cause, patients may
prefer that their deaths not be prolonged unduly because of their altruistic desire to
donate healthy organs to persons in need of transplants.
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If, as urged above, the rationale of Roe suggests a prima facie right
to select the moment of one's death, 43 a number of issues remain open.
Can the right be limited by countervailing state interest? If so, under
what circumstances can the right be exercised? Answers to these ques-
tions require a closer examination of the reasoning employed by the
Court in the abortion decisions.
44
In Roe, the Court, after taking notice of the intimate quality and
momentous effect of a woman's decision to bear or not to bear a child,45
considered a number of state interests that had been urged as weighing
against her free exercise of the right to an abortion. Some interests, such
as deterring sexual immorality, were rejected immediately as constitu-
tionally improper state purposes.4" Others, such as the interests in
regulating medical procedures47 and in protecting the potential life of
the fetus, 48 were held to be more substantial and were accommodated in
the final balance struck by the opinion.40 In each case, the Court closely
examined the cognizable interest in light of its impact on both the
organic pattern of the growing fetus and the pregnant woman. 0 Since
abortion prior to the end of the first trimester is safer than natural
childbirth, the Court concluded that the state's interest in regulating
surgical procedures was insufficient to forbid abortion prior to that
time."1 By the end of the first trimester, however, the balance tips;
natural childbirth becomes safer than surgical intervention. 2 Thus, the
Court held that from this point on, the state may legitimately regulate
the place and manner in which abortions are performed."3 As to the
state's interest in protecting the fetus, the Court concluded that this
interest becomes compelling and therefore limits free choice only upon
the end of the second trimester of pregnancy, when the fetus becomes
viable.5
4
As with abortion, a number of interests have been advanced to
43. Cf. Ely, supra note 21, at 935-36, on the analogous conclusion reached by the
Court in Roe with respect to a woman's choice to have an abortion.
44. For an excellent analysis of the step-by-step procedure involved in judicially
assessing the merit of a privacy-based claim, see Comment, The Right to Abortion:
Expansion of the Right to Privacy Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 19 CATHOLIC
LAw. 36 (1974). See also Note, supra note 1.
45. 410 U.S. at 153.
46. Id. at 148; see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448 (1972).
47. 410 U.S. at 163; see Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927); Jacobson v. Massachu-
setts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
48. 410 U.S. at 163-64.
49. Id. at 162-64.
50. Id. at 149-50, 155, 164.
51. Id. at 163-64.
52. Id.
53. The regulation, however, must be such as "reasonably relates to the preservation
and protection of maternal health." Id. at 163.
54. From this point on, abortions may be prohibited "except when. . . necessary to
preserve the life or health of the mother." Id. at 164,
[Vol. 17
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justify society's refusal to permit its members to select the timing of their
own deaths. Some of the more common of these will be considered in
the next section. At this point, the lesson to be drawn from the abortion
cases is that important personal decisions, once subsumed under the
right of privacy, are not automatically defeated by a showing of any
colorable state interest. The state interest must be substantial55 and must
be closely tailored to the furtherance of that interest.56 Blanket prohibi-
tions, like the abortion statute invalidated in Roe,5 7 are initially suspect.
Nevertheless, an emerging right is unlikely to be absolute when the state
retains important interests in limiting its exercise. In light of the close
parallel between abortion and euthanasia,58 it should be expected that
the instances calling for limitation of the right to choose death will bear
a close relationship to the stage of human life at which the interests
justifying governmental intervention appear.
THE QUALIFmD RiGHT TO Dm
Among the interests that could be asserted in opposition to the
right to die are: (1) that the state has a duty to protect the lives of
persons;59 (2) that since death is an irreversible process, the risks to
both the patient00 and his physician61 of a hasty or in-informed decision
are unacceptable; (3) that permitting individuals to die who are under
55. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-55 (1973); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist.
No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
56. "Where certain fundamental rights are involved. . . legislative enactments must
be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake. . . ." Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. at 155. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965);
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 307-08 (1940).
57. The statute in question had excepted from criminality "only a life-saving
procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard to pregnancy stage and without
recognition of the other interests involved. . ." 410 U.S. at 164.
58. See text & notes 19-42 supra and 127-30 infra.
59. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-57 (1973); J. GOULD & Low) CRAiGMYLE,
YouR DEATH WARRANT?: THE IMPLICATIONS OF EUTHANASIA 1-2 (1971). See also
In re Quinlan, No. C-201-75 (Sup. Ct., Ch. Div., Morris County, N.J., Nov. 10, 1975),
in which the trial court refused to grant the request of the father of an irreversibly
comatose 21-year-old woman to be permitted to discontinue certain medical treatment
when such discontinuation would have resulted in her death. The father had argued
that the right of privacy, among others, protected his decision to terminate his daugh-
ter's treatment. The court refused to grant his request. In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d
619 (C.P. Northhampton County, Pa. 1973) (see discussion note 16 supra and text &
note 81 infra) was distinguished on the ground that the Quinlan woman was comatose,
hence incapable of making her own decisions, and the court's traditional role of acting
in the interest of an incompetent precluded giving effect to the father's choice. In re
Quinlan, supra at 36-38.
60. Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Killing" Legisla-
tion, 42 MINN. L. Rav. 969, 983 (1958), citing Lazslo, Colmer, Silver & Standard, Errors
in Diagnosis and Management of Cancer, 33 ANNALs OF TRNAL MEDICInm 670
(1950).
61. See In re President & Director of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1009
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
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medical treatment violates the physician's ethical code, his right to
practice his profession, and the Hippocratic oath:62 (4) that permitting
individuals to choose the moment of their deaths will undermine respect
for the sanctity of life6" by usurping a decision only God should make;04
(5) that recognition of such a right will serve as an "entering wedge"
for compulsory elimination of the aged, the unproductive, and the
genetically defective; 5 (6) that society depends on the productivity and
hence the continued existence of its members; s6 and (7) that the death
of some will leave dependents destitute and unable to care for them-
selves. 6
7
Duty to Protect Life
The argument for a duty to protect life derives initial plausibility
from the significance attached to personhood in Roe. The Court was
required to consider whether a fetus is a person within the meaning of
the 14th amendment because the state's interest in protecting the life
of a 14th amendment person would overshadow the mother's privacy
interest6 ' Although the Court's reasoning was not made explicit,
it apparently assumed that if fetal life is protected from state action
by the due process clause of the 14th amendment, then a compelling
state interest in protecting it from private action would thereby be
established. Since one whose election of death is encompassed within
the right of privacy would be a constitutional person, 9 a similarly com-
pelling state interest in preserving his life would appear.
This argument gains its appeal by focusing on one important
distinction between euthanasia and abortion while ignoring another. To
62. See Cantor, supra note 16, at 250; Morrison, Dying, ScIENTIFIc AM., Sept. 1973,
at 55. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130-32, 141-46 (1973); id. at 219-20
(Douglas, J., concurring); In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331
F.2d 1000, 1009 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); United States v.
George, 239 F. Supp. 752, 754 (D. Conn. 1965).
63. Devlin, Morals and Contemporary Social Reality, in P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCE-
MENT OF MORAL.S 124 (1965); Hassett, supra note 33, at 1186; see Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 286 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
64. See Fletcher, Ethics and Euthanasia, 73 AM. J. NuRsiNG 670, 673-75 (1973).
65. J. GOULD & LoRD CRAIGMYLE, supra note 59, at 129; Kamisar, supra note 60, at
1026, 1030-41. See generally D. MAGIImE, supra note 10, at 88, 132-36; Louisell,
Abortion, the Practice of Medicine, and the Due Process of Law, 16 U.C.L.A.L. Rnv.
233, 249 (1969).
66. Note, Unauthorized Rendition of Lifesaving Medical Treatment, 53 CALIF. L.
Rav. 860, 862 (1965); cf. Note, supra note 39, at 1660. See also Bisenius v. Karns, 42
Wis. 2d 42, 52, 165 N.W.2d 377, 382, appeal dismissed, 395 U.S. 709 (1969). The
interest in productivity underlies many statutory enactments, such as compulsory educa-
tion laws. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 493 (1953).
67. Cantor, supra note 16, at 251-54; Comment, Compulsory Medical Treatment.
The State's Interest Re-evaluated, 51 MINN. L. Rnv. 293, 298-301 (1966).
68. 410 U.S. at 156-57.
69. The 14th amendment protects only persons from deprivation of liberty without
due process of law. Accordingly, the assertion of a 14th amendment liberty interest, such
as privacy, presupposes personhood. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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be sure, the person whose life would be terminated by euthanasia differs
from the fetus whose life ends in abortion in that the latter lacks
personhood for constitutional purposes.70 But the euthanasia decision
also differs from the abortion decision in that no third entity, whether a
person or not, is involved; the right to death is exercised by the same
individual whose right to life the state seeks to protect. When, by
electing euthanasia, the individual has expressly renounced his right to
life, the state cannot reasonably assert an interest in protecting that right
as a basis for overriding the individual's private decision to die. To hold
otherwise makes little more sense than urging a prohibition against
destroying or giving away one's private property simply because the
Constitution protects property as well as life. Although the Constitution
recognizes that human life is, to most persons, of inestimable value and
protects against its taking without due process of law, nothing in that
document compels a person to continue living who does not desire to do
so. Such an interpretation effectively converts a right into an obligation,
a result the constitutional framers manifestly did not intend.
The Risk of Error
Although the state's interest in preserving life loses force when the
individual whose life is at stake voluntarily chooses to renounce it,
determing when such a free election has occurred may not always be
easy. The dying patient may be drugged, in pain, or unaware of the
totality of his medical condition.71 Error is also possible because of
possible collusion by individuals who stand to gain by his death. 72
Moreover, the decision to die, once acted upon, may well prove irrevers-
ible.73 Life is too precious, it has been urged, to permit its termination
when there is the slightest possibility that the decision to die will prove
erroneous or based on false premises. 74 Unlike other irreversible surgical
interventions such as amputations, sterilizations, and organ transplants,
the possibility that the patient will have any future at all is at stake.7"
Consequently, individuals must be protected from the consequences of
70. Although constitutional personhood appears to be a quality which one either has
or lacks, the parallel between some of the likely candidates for euthanasia and fetuses
before the end of the second trimester of pregnancy is worthy of mention. Persons who
depend on life-sustaining machinery are, like fetuses before viability, "incapable of
meaningful life" apart from that machinery. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163. The
Court in Roe determined when a compelling state interest in protecting the fetus arose
on the basis of this and other considerations. Id.
71. Kamisar, supra note 60, at 986-88.
72. See id. at 990-91; Moore, supra note 14, at 335.
73. Kamisar, supra note 60, at 975-76.
74. E.g., id. at 1026, 1030-41.
75. Thus, drawing by analogy on the principle of criminal law that it is better to let
100 guilty persons go free than to convict one innocent man, one writer concludes that
the suffering caused by prohibiting euthanasia is acceptable if necessary to prevent the
wrongful taking of human life. Kamisar, supra note 60, at 1005-13.
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their own fallibility, and physicians must continue to be prohibited from
rendering life-taking assistance in response to patients' voluntary re-
quests.
In the absence of procedural safeguards-such as requirements
that the patient's request be repeated on separate occasions,7 0 that the
patient be lucid and alert,77 and that he be questioned by a panel of
laymen and psychiatrists 7s-this argument might have some appeal,
particularly in close cases where the possibility of error is greatest. A
prohibition against all voluntary election, however, cuts too broadly; the
argument derives its persuasiveness from the possibility of hard cases
when in reality most cases will be easy ones. Certainly, a prohibition of
all elective euthanasia cannot be sustained because of the risk of error in
a few cases; even if protection of the possible victims of error is a
compelling interest, the statute must be drawn so as to vindicate that
interest by the least drastic means.7 9
More importantly, such objections seem to rest on a confusion
about the role of error. Error, for some commentators, occurs when a
patient selects death in circumstances where others would consider such
a decision mistaken or unreasonable.8 0 The issue, however, is not wheth-
er the patient's decision comports with the sensibility of others but
whether or not he made the decision. If a competent and informed
decision has been made, traditional legal notions of autonomy and self-
determination favor the protection of individual choice, even if that
choice seems to others foolish or tragic.8' Determining whether a given
decision has been made is, of course, a much simpler task than deter-
mining whether or not it has been wisely made.
Even if it is granted that the state has a legitimate interest in
76. E.g., ST. JOHNs-STEvAs, LIFE, DEATH, AND THE LAw 267 (1961); Cantor, supra
note 16, at 260-61; Sanders, supra note 6, at 352 (describing a proposal by the English
Euthanasia Society).
77. See Comment, Euthanasia: Tort, Constitutional, and Legal Considerations, 48
NoTRE DAME LAW. 1203, 1256 (1973). See also Kutner, supra note 9 (proposing a
"living will"). Decisions of individuals who are incompetent, of course, need not be given
effect. Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 407, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (1960). And,
patients who are deranged from extreme pain are manifestly not competent to make
these decisions. Still, not all physically ill persons are deranged; nor are all such persons
incompetent to make choices about their futures.
78. See authorities cited note 76 supra.
79. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 485 (1965); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1940).
80. See Kamisar, supra note 60, at 1007-13.
81. In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1009
(D.C. Cir.), cert.-denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619 (C.P.
Northampton County, Pa. 1973); J. MLL, ON LMEaRTaY 6-8 (People's ed. 1873); see In
re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372, 374-75 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972); In re Brooke, 32 Il. 2d 361,
372-73, 205 N.E.2d 435, 442 (1965).
For a discussion of determinations of competency, see Friedman, Legal Regulation




protecting individuals from foolish or ill-considered self-destruction, that
interest appears to be seriously undermined by the inconsistency with
which it pursues that goal."2 In other contexts, society has declined to
intervene when individuals competently choose to engage in behavior
dangerous only to themselves, such as climbing mountain peaks or
eating rich food.8 3 In these and other instances, the individual is neither
required to demonstrate his competency nor the soundness of his deci-
sion. Admittedly, there is a difference between engaging in activity the
outcome of which is uncertain and initiating medical procedures certain
to cause death. At the same time, however, the latter decision is one
entitled to great respect since it falls within a constitutionally protected
area of privacy."4 On balance, the possibility of error or mistake could
be sufficiently limited through procedural safeguards so as to render this
an insufficient basis to preclude absolutely the individual's election of
death as a final means of escape from his condition.
In addition to assuring that the patient has in fact decided to elect
euthanasia, it must be established that he is competent to make this
election. Two objections may be raised. First, it may be urged that a
decision to die runs counter to strong survival instincts and therefore-
unlike a decision to elect life-saving surgery--constitutes evidence of
incompetency. Second, and more serious, is the problem of coercion. It
has been suggested that the judgment of terminal patients may be so
influenced by drugs, pain, pressure from family members, or financial
difficulties 5 as to make free decisions unlikely.
The suggestion that a decision to die is always evidence of mental
incapacity is untenable, both constitutionally and as medical fact. First,
if the decision to die is, as was previously argued, protected by the
constitutional right of privacy, it cannot be made evidence, in itself, of a
defective mental state.86 Second, the belief that only a person whose
82. The state's failure to assert an interest as compelling in one context casts doubt
on the compelling nature of that interest when its application is attempted in other areas,
especially since the danger from which the individual is sought to be protected-being
killed-is similar in each case. To be sure, in opinions involving purely economic
regulation, courts have been willing to permit the state to pursue its objectives inconsist-
ently or in piecemeal manner, Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78
(1911), but when fundamental interests are involved, the standard is higher and
inconsistency of application may prove fatal. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,
484-85 (1970).
83. Statutes designed primarily, or exclusively, to protect the individual from his
own acts, however, have been upheld in certain contexts. See cases cited in Cantor, supra
note 16, at 247-48. These have generally involved activities such as motorcycling without
a crash helmet or consuming contaminated food. These prohibitions, however, do not
result in denial of a right of constitutional proportions such as that involved in the
decision to die.
84. See text & notes 19.42 supra.
85. Note, supra note 39, at 1657.
86. Analogously, the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination protects
against penalizing the exercise of that right by drawing an inference of guilt from the
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faculties are impaired would choose death simply is not true. Many
dying patients welcome death as a friend and view its approach calmly
and with equanimity.8 7 Perhaps society's preoccupation with death as a
tragedy to be avoided at all costs prevents us from realizing this.88 But,
regardless of the source of this attitude, it should not be imposed upon
unwilling patients so as to deny them access to the relief they desire.
The possibility of decisions coerced by pain and the stress of illness
is one which must be taken seriously but which cannot be permitted to
preclude all choice. It would surely be paradoxical if, to avoid the
possibility of coercion in certain instances, the state enacted a blanket
prohibition that had the effect of removing all free choice. Neither the
law of succession ° nor that of informed consent to medical procedures 0
has found it necessary to resort to such a drastic approach, and it would
seem that such a presumption of incompetence is even less appropriate
when applied to preclude exercise of a right of the proportions of that
involved here. Rather, the effort should center around a search for ways
to ensure that only those patients who are uncoercedl are permitted to
elect death and that the decision is made with the patient's full under-
standing of his condition. This approach admits the legitimacy of the
need to protect against the coerced decision of the momentarily pain-
crazed patient but does not do so at the price of stifling the free choice
of all patients, including those who genuinely want to die.
The Physician's Professional Responsibility
It has been urged that recognizing a right on the part of patients to
elect death would place an intolerable strain on the physician, whose
defendant's silence. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). Allowing an inference of
incompetence to arise from exercise of the right to die would impose a similar penalty.
The analogy to Griffin is somewhat inexact, however, since imposition of such a penalty
does not "chill" a dying patient's exercise of his right in precisely the same way an
inference of guilt chills a criminal defendant's exercise of his fifth amendment right to
remain silent. In the Griffin case, chilling occurs as a result of imposition of a criminal
sanction; in the case of the dying patient, as a result of erecting a legal bar to making a
competent choice. The net result, however, is the same: inhibition of a constitutional
right because of a state-sanctioned practice.
87. Note, supra note 39, at 1647-48. See generally 0. KNOPF, SUCCESSFUL AGING:
THE FACTS AND FALLACIES OF GROWING OLD 182-84 (1975).
88. Note, supra note 39, at 1647.
89. T. ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS 232-39 (2d ed. 1953).
90. Grannum v. Berard, 70 Wash. 2d 304, 422 P.2d 812 (1967); see In re Yetter, 62
Pa. D. & C.2d 619 (C.P. Northampton County, Pa. 1973); Peterson v. Ertsland, 69
Wash. 2d 588, 594, 419 P.2d 332, 336 (1966). See generally Note, supra note 39, at
1651-53.
91. Arguably, a pain-racked, terminally ill patient will never be uncoerced. The
issue of voluntary choices in stressful situations has been addressed in other contexts,
however, and few authorities have found it necessary to adopt the extreme view that
consent in such situations is per se impossible. Cf. Friedman, supra note 81, at 80-87.
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professional loyalties are to the preservation of life.92 Alternatively, it
may be argued that the public will lose confidence in the medical
profession if it learns that physicians may, in certain circumstances,
euthanatize their patients.93 These objections are unpersuasive.94 Even if
well founded, it is improbable that these reservations, to the extent they
are based on the pecuniary or professional interests of physicians as a
class, would rise to the level of a compelling interest.95 To the extent the
physician's objections are based on his personal, moral, or religious
feelings, the first amendment simply requires that the law take no
account of them.96 To the extent they are based on the desire to protect
liberty-the physician's freedom to practice his profession without con-
straints-they are easily met by observing that the physician is not
compelled to euthanatize anyone, but is merely protected from criminal
sanctions if he does so.
97
92. See authorities cited note 62 supra.
93. J. GouLD & Loan CRmMYLE, supra note 59, at 104.
94. For example, a majority of the American public approves of euthanasia for
death-bound, seriously ill patients. MEDICAL WORLD NEws, Sept. 14, 1973, at 74. Thus,
the objection that public confidence in the medical profession would be weakened seems
groundless.
95. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969). See also Note, supra note 39, at 1646.
Several courts have warned that recognition of a right to die might subject hospitals
and medical personnel to unreasonable liability from the threat of malpractice and
wrongful death suits. In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d
1000, 1009 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); United States v. George, 239
F. Supp. 752, 754 (D. Conn. 1965); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58
N.J. 576, 580, 279 A.2d 670, 673 (1971). Such liability could arise in a number of ways.
Following the patient's death, relatives might sue for wrongful death, claiming that the
patient's consent was invalid since he was incompetent. Or a patient's choice to die,
though competent, may have been based on erroneous information given him by the
hospital or physician. The former danger-that an apparently lucid but incompetent
patient will succeed in convincing the physician to euthanatize him-can be reduced by
the institution of some of the simple precautionary procedures discussed above. In
questionable cases, physicians and hospitals could seek a judicial hearing and court order,
thereby insulating themselves from liability. See In re President & Directors of George-
town College, supra; In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619 (C.P. Northampton County, Pa.
1973). Such precautions would not protect the physician or hospital from the conse-
quences of negligent misinformation or misdiagnosis which resulted in the patient's
decision to end his life. Consequently, medical personnel might be confronted by
conflicting and seemingly irreconcilable risks. Once having advised the patient, to the
best of their knowledge, and having been requested by him to perform euthanasia, the
hospital must either accede to his desires and run the risk of a lawsuit if their medical
judgment proves incorrect, or else deny the patient assistance in asserting his constitu-
tional right to die. In response to this argument, it should be observed that the restrain-
ing effect of potential liability would have the salutary result of making physicians ex-
tremely careful about the information they give terminal patients who are contemplating
euthanasia. Yet, this need for great care need not "chill" medical practice; the doctor
need only be sure that his information is the best available in light of the importance
of the decision.
96. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420 (1961).
97. In reality, surveys have demonstrated that a substantial majority of physicians
tacitly approve of euthanasia, Comment, supra note 33, at 674; Comment, supra note 6,
at 615, at least by passive means, whereby death is hastened by the discontinuation of
artificial life support measures. See id. at 613-16. Thus, moral-professional objections
from the medical community would seem to pose little practical or theoretical obstacle to
relaxing the present prohibition against mercy killing. 12
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The Sanctity of Life
Another interest allegedly served by denying individuals the right
to choose the moment of their deaths is that of preserving respect for
"the sanctity of life." At times this suggestion is couched in terms of a
religious imperative:98 only God may decide when a human life is to
end. 99 The interest sought to be preserved is not that of preventing the
overreaching of one individual by another, as was at issue in Roe, but
rather avoidance of the cheapening and deprecation of the value of life
that could result from permitting individuals to take their own lives.
Because the lives at issue are those of mature human beings, the shock
value of such decisions could be greater than in the case of fetuses, and
the potential effect on public attitudes more severe.
Nevertheless, the assertion-at least to the extent that it expresses
something other than an ultimate, and hence unchallengeable, religious
concern-is false on its face and incapable of being advanced by the
state consistently with its actions in other contexts. It is false because
most life that would be terminated simply is not sacred in any meaning-
ful secular sense. There is little that is sacred or ennobling about a
modem hospital room or nursing home °0 or the array of instruments
and tubes used to prolong life a few more days or hours. The extreme
reluctance of our society to confront squarely the reality of death blinds
us to the fact that, for the dying patient, the alternatives are not living or
dying.1 1 They are, rather, a protracted death or one that comes more
quickly. When dying is protracted, it is often accompanied by fear,
indignity, loss of control of bodily functions, and incessant pain that is
uncontrollable by drugs.'0 2 In such situations, permitting death with
dignity is perceived by those most intimately involved as the most
humane solution and more consistent with a concern for the spiritual
side of man's nature than a focus on life purely in vegetative or quantita-
tive terms.'0 The recent statutory trend to redefine the moment of death
in terms of capacity for meaningful life is consistent with this sugges-
tion.10
4
98. The sanctity of life argument may well surface in a different, and conceivably
more compelling, form when expressed in meta-utilitarian or transcendental terms. The
"entering wedge" argument, see text accompanying notes 109-18 infra, likewise appears
susceptible of being recast in meta-utilitarian, but nonreligious terms. See generally dis-
cussion note 18 supra.
99. Hassett, supra note 33, at 1184-88.
100. See Brown, An Appraisal of the Nursing Home Enforcement Process, 17 ARiz.
L. REv. 304, 311-12 (1975).
101. See Cantor, supra note 16, at 259; Williams, supra note 10, at 179; Note, supra
note 39, at 1650.
102. See authorities cited notes 11-12, 14-15 supra.
103. E.g., D. MAG uI, supra note 10, at 7-8, 10-13; Cantor, supra note 16, at 243;
Moore, supra note 14, at 332.
104. See generally Comment, supra note 6, at 627.
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In no other context does our system of values require uncompro-
mising observance of life as the highest value.105 We require our youth
to render military service in frequent wars and police actions, and when
they lose their lives in combat, we celebrate them as heroes. Scenes of
the Vietnam conflict were shown in color in every living room, and even
children's television is replete with violence and killing. Our most popu-
lar films and television programs glorify violence, and when the death
penalty was recently held unconstitutional, the states responded hastily
with statutes reinstating it on the maximum possible basis." 6 The
erosion of public respect for the sanctity of life caused by permitting
euthanasia under closely controlled circumstances would appear minis-
cule when compared to that resulting from other sources.'0 7 Thus, the
state's failure to respect life consistently in other areas suggests that its
interest in life per se is less than compelling.1
0 8
Selective Elimination
The "entering wedge" argument was also advanced in the abortion
cases. It was urged that permitting unrestricted access to abortions in the
first trimester would eventually lead to infanticide and the elimination of
mature individuals considered socially undesirable. 0 9 The Court evi-
dently did not find this pessimistic view so much as plausible, for the
argument was rejected as insufficient to warrant discussion, let alone to
overcome the mother's privacy interest.
The refusal to reply to the entering wedge argument was appro-
priate since the argument does not respond to the issue at hand. Absent
a showing that euthanasia or abortion would necessarily lead to the
horribles paraded in opposition to them, the argument at most shows that
these horribles are to be avoided but says nothing about abortion or
euthanasia." 0 If, on the other hand, the argument is given a charitable
construction-as urging that no principled distinction can be drawn
105. See generally Note, supra note 39, at 1647.
106. E.g., FLA. SrAT. ANN. § 921.141 (Supp. 1975-76); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1
(Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202 (Supp. 1973); see Comment, Resurrection
of the Death Penalty: The Validity of Arizona's Response to Furman v. Georgia, 1974
Amz. ST. L.J. 257; Note, The New Illinois Death Penalty: Double Constitutional Trou-
ble, 5 LoYOLA U.L.J. 351 (1974).
107. The euthanatizing of able-bodied young persons, particularly parents, is likely to
be barred by considerations to be developed more fully later. See text & notes 119-30
infra. The interest in denying individuals an opportunity to engage in acts deliberately
designed to denigrate the value of human life might, however, have the effect of denying
individuals the opportunity to exercise the right of voluntary euthanasia as part of a
publicity-seeking venture or self-immolation.
108. See discussion note 82 supra.
109. Brief for Appellant in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 41-45, Byrn v. New
York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 410 U.S. 949 (1973). Byrn was one of a group of
abortion cases that reached the Supreme Court about.the same time as Roe v. Wade. See
also Louisell, supra note 65, at 249.
110. See Morris, supra note 10, at 265.
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between elective euthanasia and admitted horribles like compulsory
elimination of undesirables-it is simply mistaken."' The distinction is
the obvious difference between recognition of individual autonomy and
invasion of that autonomy. Indeed, even if it is assumed that no distinc-
tion may be drawn, rejection of the entering wedge argument in the
abortion cases a fortiori requires its rejection in the case of elective
euthanasia, since the difference in principle between killing a second
trimester fetus and killing an infant is obviously not so great as the
difference between honoring an individual's wish to die and killing him
against his wishes." 2
In reality, those considerations that warrant extending the right of
privacy to cover voluntary election of the moment of death operate to
constrain state efforts toward compulsory elimination of undesirables.
Surely, no one would argue that the Court's recognition of a right to buy
and sell contraceptives"13 amounted to an invitation to governmental
control of the distribution of contraceptives. Nor did recognition of a
realm of family autonomy in decisions relating to childrearing result in
state incursions in this area."14 To so argue is surely inverse logic, since
in each case, the limitations on state authority were specifically designed
to increase the autonomy of the individual vis-h-vis the state, not dimin-
ish it.
A variant of the argument that permitting the individual to choose
the moment of his death invites the state to make the decision for him
centers around the government's role in supervising medical procedure.
Many of the procedural safeguards necessary to ensure that the right is
exercised in conformity with agreed limitations", will presumably be
entrusted to the state's courts and administrative agencies. Arguably, the
power to make such decisions invites abuse. For example, a government
that harbored a bias against citizens of a certain class might arrange that
they be denied the benefit of euthanasia if by so doing the estates of
111. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160-61 (1973); Winston, On Treating
Like Cases Alike, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1974). This conviction was a major factor in the
formation of the right-to-life opposition to abortion, including substantial support from
the Roman Catholic Church. See Roe v. Wade, supra at 160-61.
112. See Note, supra note 39, at 1663. Theologians might challenge this contention,
urging that consensual killing is indistinguishable from other killing, since both violate
the principle that only God may decide when a person is to die. Thus all termination of
life is an affront to God and must be avoided even at the cost of a great increase in
human suffering. Unless a secular basis for this contention can be found, however, the
establishment clause of the Constitution forbids imposing it on society through force of
law. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961).
113. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
114. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
115. For suggestion of some such safeguards, see text & notes 76-78 supra.
[Vol. 17
EUTHANASIA
unpopular or politically dissident families or groups could be deplet-
ed.11" Alternatively, the government could collude with physicians to
give medical misinformation to undesirables in the hope that they would
then choose to die. The latter result seems farfetched since a govern-
ment capable of such machinations would undoubtedly have more effi-
cacious and direct means of accomplishing its purposes. 117 The former
result would seem likely only if the decisionmaking machinery were com-
pletely insulated from review by the courts, the public, and the press, a
result easily avoided by proper drafting of any statute or order recogniz-
ing a right to die.'"'
Productivity and Dependency
Two final, closely related objections to permissive euthanasia are
more substantial. They are the state's interest in the productive capacity
of citizens" 9 and its interest in avoiding the destitution of surviving
dependents. 20 The former interest supplies, in part, the justification for
compulsory education statutes;' 2' the latter has been advanced in blood
transfusion cases as sufficient to override patients' first amendment
objections to receiving emergency medical treatment necessary to pre-
serve their lives.'
22
In individual cases, these interests might well be compelling. Imag-
ine, for instance, a wage earner and father of several children who is
suffering from cancer. The course of the disease, presently incurable and
one for which no cure is likely in the near future, 23 can nevertheless be
116. For an excellent discussion of some of the problems of distributive justice
involved in allocating biomedical benefits, see Shapiro, Who Merits Merit? Problems in
Distributive Justice and Utility Posed by the New Biology, 48 S. CALF. L. REv. 318
(1974).
117. See D. MAGOmE, supra note 10, at 88, 132 (describing the shocking events that
took place in Nazi Germany prior to and during World War 11). See also Alexander,
Medical Science Under Dictatorship, 241 NEw ENGLAND J. MEDICIm 39, 40, 44 (1949).
Such events are cited by proponents of the view that society can ill afford to relax its
vigilance against the possible revival of such barbarities. These arguments, however,
ignore the gross disparities between the cultural and political settings of Nazi Germany
and present-day United States and thus lack historical plausibility.
118. Statutes or judicial orders could, for example, require that some form of limited
access to the press be made available. They could also require that membership on
committees of inquiry include representation from lay, religious, and medical communi-
ties. For a discussion of review committees to ensure proper use of behavior modification
techniques, see Friedman, supra note 81, at 95-100.
119. See Note, Unauthorized Rendition of Lifesaving Medical Treatment, 53 CAL.
L. REv. 860, 862 (1965); cf. Note, supra note 39, at 1660.
120. Cantor, supra note 16, at 251-54; Comment, supra note 67, at 298-301. See In re
Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619, 623 (C.P. Northampton County, Pa. 1973).
121. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 493 (1953).
122. Compare In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d
1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964), with In re Estate of Brooks, 32
Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
123. The possibility of a miraculous 11th-hour medical breakthrough has been urged
as a justification for denying gravely ill individuals assistance in hastening the moment of
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contr6lled to some extent by radiation treatment and chemotherapy, so
that the individual has a life expectancy of perhaps 2 years. Without
treatment, the father will die within 6 months. Both measures, however,
are expensive and have deleterious side effects. The father, after careful
consideration, concludes that life under his present conditions is not
worth living. Lacking the courage to commit suicide, or perhaps reluc-
tant to incur the notoriety that such an act might bring for his survi-
vors,124 he requests that his physician administer a lethal dose of a pain-
killing drug. The physician refuses on the sole ground that he will face
criminal prosecution, and the father seeks a declaratory judgment.
In these circumstances, it seems plausible that the state's interests
in forbidding the father to choose death outweigh his interest in seeking
an early and painless end.125 The father has not passed the point of
productivity and should not be permitted to avoid his obligation to
support his dependents. On the other hand, once the father's disease has
run its course and left him bedridden and unable to engage in work or
family activities, the state's interests diminish, and his request to die
should be honored.
1 2 6
Roe suggested that the state's interests in preserving the human
organism vary-as a matter of constitutional doctrine-with the condi-
tion of the organism at the different stages of its life.127 Although the
analogy is far from perfect-indeed the interest equations are precisely
reversed-the case of the father illustrates some similarities between the
developmental process affecting fetuses and that involving persons who
wish to die. The state's interest in the fetus vis-,.-vis the mother grows as
the fetus matures and eventually becomes compelling at viability.128 The
state's interest in the person who requests medical assistance in dying, on
the other hand, may at first be compelling, but becomes less than
death. Kamisar, supra note 60, at 999-1005. But such medical miracles, even if an-
nounced during the critical period of decision, are rarely available in time to help the
afflicted patient. Morris, supra note 10, at 262.
124. The early common law "punished" the successful suicide by burial on the public
highway, with a stake through the chest. Comment, The Punishment of Suicide-A Need
for Change, 14 VrL. L. REv. 463, 465 (1969). Although this barbaric practice has
ceased, society often attaches ignominy to the suicide. This sense of shame often has
adverse psychological effects on the survivors. Cf. Cantor, supra note 16, at 245-46. See
also D. MAGuE, supra note 10, at 220.
125. Compare In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc. 331 F.2d
1000, (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964), with In re Brooks' Estate, 32 Ill.
2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965) (declining to override adult patient's refusal of medical
aid, in absence of minor dependents).
126. If state interests can become compelling as an organism advances along its
developmental path, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), it follows that they may also
cease to be compelling when the organism has moved past the stage of optimum
development. In re Brooks' Estate, 32 Il. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965); cf. Erickson v.
Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1962); In re Raasch, No. 455-996
(P. Div., Milwaukee County Ct., Wis., Jan. 21, 1972).
127. See discussion note 126 supra.
128. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-66 (1973).
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compelling as the individual advances in age or his physical condition
deteriorates. The point at which this happens, as was suggested earlier,
will depend on the existence, in the particular case, of factors which
limit the individual's privacy interest. Such factors might include the
number of dependents, their ages and needs, the age of the individual
making the request, and his ability to be productive.
A court charged with adjudicating the constitutionality of a prohi-
bition against voluntary euthanasia might well develop a tripartite calcu-
lus similar to that created by the Supreme Court in Roe,1 9 but employ-
ing the factors enumerated above. This scheme might provide that the
state's interest in preserving the life of a younger individual with minor
dependents presumptively outweighs his interest in dying, unless he is so
incapacitated as to be unable to perform his wage-earning or parental
duties and is unlikely to regain his capabilities. In the case of a some-
what older individual, the state's interest weakens, and the individual
should be able to elect death unless there are pressing reasons for
refusing him this option, such as the need for his presence as a witness at
a criminal trial or fulfilment of some other critical social duty. An
individual in his final years should have unlimited access to medical aid
in bringing about his death, and the state should not be permitted to
prevent that choice except when intervention is the only means of
securing the continued productivity of an individual who owes the state
an important duty or who supports numerous dependents. 30 Other
interests that could be asserted against the right to die, such as the
possibility of error-that is, that one might be "throwing away" precious
life-even if compelling initially, would also be expected to decrease in
gravity as the individual approaches the natural terminus of his life. 3 '
CONCLUSION
The interest of an individual in selecting the moment of his death is
similar to that involved in a number of other highly personal choices
that are protected by the right of privacy. The decision to die is a
fundamental decision affecting the life cycle of human beings. Its effect
is felt primarily by the individual involved; it determines the shape and
duration of his life. It is a choice deserving of respect because, like
refusal to permit access to abortion, its prohibition consigns the individ-
129. Id. at 164-65.
130. The guidelines resulting from such an approach would necessarily involve two
variables, rather than the single variable (time) laid down in Roe. This would make
their utilization by physicians only slightly more complex, however, as it is just as feasi-
ble, and equally intelligible biologically, to assign yes/no values to designated pairs of
variables as to single variables.
131. See text & note 57 supra.
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ual to a life that he does not choose to lead and may find hateful. The
case for euthanasia is even stronger than that for abortion in that there is
no third being involved whose interest must be protected. On the other
hand, the individual seeking to exercise the choice is a "person"f under
the fourteenth amendment. This difference cuts both ways. Lives, argua-
bly, are deserving of greater protection than proto-lives; yet, paternalis-
tic intervention in the personal decisions of competent adults who have
waived protection is more difficult to justify than that exercised in favor
of fetuses, who presumptively want to live.
As with the abortion of healthy fetuses, voluntary euthanasia is
subject to limitations reflecting ascertainable state interests. Of the many
interests that have been asserted against permissive euthanasia, only two
survive Roe and Doe-the state's interest in the productivity of citizens
and its interest in seeing that surviving dependents not be left destitute.
In any given case, the significance of each interest must be evaluated,
taking into account the needs of individuals at varying stages in their
lives. Nevertheless, some general principles emerge. Each of the state's
interests tends to diminish over time. Each is at its maximum in connec-
tion with young wage earners who support dependents. Finally, the
general interest in preserving the life of an unwilling individual reaches
its most attenuated form in the case of persons who are of advanced age,
whose medical condition is hopeless, and for whom continued medical
treatment poses an unacceptable burden.
Those for whom life continues to hold the promises of family,
friends, and self-worth cherish existence as an ultimate value. For
others, terminal disease may guarantee only an agonizing wait for death.
Most of us fall into the former category, never, until our own final
moments, appreciating death's haven. Our insensitivity to the needs of
the dying, our bias toward the maintenance of life at all costs, permits
legislatures to turn a deaf ear to the pleas of the dying for final relief. So
long as this is so, courts will need to exercise their traditional function of
interceding on behalf of politically impotent minorities. 8 2  In carrying
out this function, the right of privacy enunciated in recent Supreme
Court opinions offers itself as a ready instrument for safeguarding the
integrity of individual choice.
132. See Ely, supra note 21, at 933-35.
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